

“Of terrorism and revenue”:

Appendix

Overview

The appendix to “Of terrorism and revenue” contains complete versions of Tables 1 and 2 in the main text; detailed descriptions and descriptive statistics of all independent variables used; checks for multicollinearity between covariates; and a number of robustness checks and alternative model specifications. Specifically, I show that multicollinearity is not a serious concern and, generally, the main conclusions presented in the main text do not change even when I:

- present the base specifications for each analysis
- account for excess zeroes and overdispersion by implementing zero-inflated count models (ZINB and hurdle)
- omit observations in which a civil war is ongoing in the recipient country
- account for the influence of outliers by replicating the main analysis without the top three US aid recipients
- use aid values lagged by one year (rather than the moving averages used in the main text)¹
- include year fixed-effects in main models
- analyze the periods before and after 2001 separately
- account for the presence of alternative sources of revenue (natural resource rents)
- estimate group survival models in a competing risks framework to account for multiple forms of failure

Summary Statistics

Table 1 shows the relative frequency of each failure type in the Jones and Libicki data. The types of failure considered in the main analysis —splintering/internal dissolution, which is the most common type of failure, and intelligence/police force—together constitute over 45% of failures in the data.

¹Unless stated otherwise, all replications in the appendix use the 3-year moving averages of each aid category

Table 2 breaks down failures by regime type, while Figure 1 shows the proportional frequency of each type of failure in each regime type. In other words, 21% of all groups that fail in military regimes do so as a result of external military intervention, whereas only 3% of groups in democracies are defeated this way.

Table 1: Summary of group failures, 1970–2006

	# of failures	% of failures	% of all groups
Police force/intel.	82	21.5%	12.6%
Splintering	135	35.4%	20.8%
External mil. intervention	23	6.03%	3.5%
Victory	29	7.6%	4.5%
Entry into politics	111	29.1%	17.1%
All failures	381	100%	58.8%
Still active*	267	—	41.2%
Total groups	648	—	—

*As of 2006

Table 2: Group failures across regime types

	Police action/intel	Splintering	Entry into politics	Achieved goals	External mil. intervention	Total
Democracy	52	89	79	12	7	238
Military	6	5	15	4	8	38
Party-based	7	10	4	4	3	28
Personalist	7	15	9	3	4	31
Monarchy	5	4	2	0	0	11
N/A*	5	20	2	6	1	33

* includes countries not contained in the GWF data, such as non-independent states (i.e., Angola pre-1975) and small population countries (Djibouti or Cyprus)

Figure 1: Types of group failure across regime types




Table 4 displays summary statistics for the terrorist attacks variables, taken from START (2012). Tables 5 and 6 contain descriptive statistics for each of the main independent variables in both data sets: U.S. foreign aid (taken from United States Agency for International Development (2014)) and regime type (taken from Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014)). Figures 4 through 7 give visual representations of the distribution of the aid data in each data set.

Table 3: Summary of Attack Variables, 1970–2010

	Minimum	Mean	Maximum	Standard Deviation
Anti-U.S. Attacks	0	0.28	49	1.7
Non-U.S. Attacks	0	10.52	1,177	52.56
Total Attacks	0	10.80	1,180	53.28

Table 4: Summary of main independent variables, 1970–2010

	Democracy	Personalist	Other regimes
Anti-U.S. Attacks	0.48	0.20	0.18
Non-U.S. Attacks	18.23	5.66	11.11
US security aid	114 million	41.3 million	70.7 million
US total aid	269 million	143 million	158 million

Description of personalism variable

Questions relevant to personalist regimes are 1) Does the leader lack the support of a party? 2) If there is a support party, was it created after the leader’s accession to power? 3) If there is a support party, does the leader choose most of the members of the politburo-equivalent? 4) Does




Figure 2: Global U.S. aid allocation, 1946-2012

the country specialist literature describe the politburo-equivalent as a rubber stamp for the leader? 5) If there is a support party, is it limited to a few urban areas? 6) Was the successor to the first leader, or is the heir apparent, a member of the same family, clan, tribe, or minority ethnic group as the first leader? 7) Does the leader govern without routine elections? 8) If there are elections, are they essentially plebiscites, i.e., without either internal or external competition? 9) Does access to high office depend on the personal favor of the leader? 10) Has normal military hierarchy been seriously disorganized or overturned? 11) Have dissenting officers or officers from different regions, tribes, religions, or ethnic groups been murdered, imprisoned, or forced into exile? 12) Has the officer corps been marginalized from most decision making? 13) Does the leader personally control the security apparatus? (Geddes, 2003, 227)².

All regimes are given a score for each regime category (personalist, single-party, monarchy, and military regime) equal to the ratio of affirmative answers to total answers, and the typology is assigned according to the highest score. In other words, all regimes have a score for each regime type, but the highest score determines that the regime's designated typology. Some have high scores in multiple categories. For example, Indonesia is classified as a party-based autocracy during Suharto's reign, but the regime also displayed elements of personal and military rule, and thus is also considered a "hybrid" between the three. I consider military or party-based regimes with tinges of personalism, such as Assad's Syria or Mubarak's Egypt, to be quite different from the pure personalist rule of Mobutu or Marcos, and therefore only "pure" personalist regimes are considered as such in this paper. The "non-personalist" category thus includes party- and military-based regimes, monarchies, democracies, and non-regime categories such as warlord rule (i.e., Somalia 1992-present), foreign-occupied (i.e., Iraq 2004-2010), and provisional (i.e., Georgia 2004).³

Table 7 contains a list of all periods of personalist rule in the data between 1970 and 2010. Personalist regimes which ended before 1970 are not included, and end dates for regimes that fell

²Svolik (2012) likens personalism to a more continuous, dynamic process that occurs in stages. The culmination of the process is what he calls "established autocracy," a point at which the dictator holds all power. The view of personalism presented here, while expressed as a discrete regime type, accurately reflects a regime that has passed a number of benchmarks along Svolic's path to "established autocracy." While it is certainly true that there is variation even within the "personalist" category, capturing this is not possible given data limitations.

³The distribution of the personalism variable in each data set is shown in Table 2 of the appendix.

after 2010 (e.g., Libya) are not specified. Figure 8 demonstrates the relative frequency of personalist dictatorships over time.

Description of additional independent variables

I include a number of additional explanatory variables often found to be related to the occurrence and duration of terrorist campaigns and domestic conflict. First, I use the natural log of GDP per capita, lagged by one year, to roughly capture the level of income. A less wealthy state is likely to have a more difficult time eliminating an insurgent group than is a wealthy state, all else equal, so I expect this variable to have a positive effect on the probability that a group is eliminated in a given year. Data for this variable are taken from Maddison (2012).

More populous countries are thought to experience more frequent and enduring conflict (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Fearon, 2004) and also more terrorist attacks (Piazza and Wilson, 2013). To allow for this, I include the natural log of country population, taken from the World Bank (2014), in both sets of models.

I also include two time-period indicators in the duration and count models. First, the end of the Cold War may have had an effect on the use of terrorism by non-state actors, and certainly had an effect on state sponsorship behavior ((Pillar, 2004; Byman, 2005)), so I include a *Cold War* indicator in each model. Similarly, terrorism assumed a more prominent role in international politics after the September 11 attacks. I include an indicator for the years 2002 and after to account for this.

Given that the dependent variable in the count models is terrorist attacks taken from the Global Terrorism Dataset (GTD), it is important to consider how methods of data collection might affect the value of the outcome variable. Since 1970, GTD has made several significant changes and improvements in the methodology used to compile data on terrorist attacks that will, in turn, have important effects on how many attacks are recorded in the data. Quantifying these effects would entail an empirical effort well beyond the scope of this paper. However, I try to account for this by including indicators for the periods 1970-1997; 1998-2008; and 2009-2012, which represent the discrete methodological “eras”.

Similarly, the GTD is heavily reliant upon local and international media sources for information about terrorist attacks. However, media coverage and freedom vary widely across the world, and in ways that may or may not be correlated with the frequency of terrorism. For instance, the common finding that democracies experience high levels of terrorism relative to other regimes could be due to openness or some other political feature of democracies; or it might simply be an artifact of the systematic under-reporting of terrorism in non-democratic regimes. To control for possible under-reporting bias in the dependent variable in the count models, I include a categorical measure of media freedom, ranging from 1 (free) to 4 (not free), and taken from Whitten-Woodring and Belle (2014).

Another potential confounding factor is the presence of a military regime in the recipient. Often, if the military in a country perceives that a civilian government is unwilling or incapable of prosecuting an effective counterinsurgency campaign, it will mount a coup and govern directly until the insurgent group or groups have been vanquished (Stepan, 1971). Because of a military's institutional preference for stability and less dependence on patronage for survival, it may not be as prone to using domestic terrorist groups as leverage. Using data taken from Wright (2008), I therefore include an indicator variable that equals 1 if a military regime was in power in a country in which a group was based, and a 0 otherwise.

The original Jones and Libicki (2008) data also include some other useful information about the goals and orientation of each group that may affect their duration. Some groups are listed as *territorial* if their primary concern is the achievement of some form of autonomy or independence for a piece of territory within a country. Because these pieces of territory are often located at the periphery of a country, far from the capital, they are likely to be more difficult for a state to defeat, and defeating these groups may not even be worth the effort from the point of view of the state. Several secessionist groups operating in India's far northeast have been fighting a low-level conflict with the central government for nearly 60 years. Fearon (2004) and others find statistical support for this idea, as secessionist conflicts are found to last longer than other types of conflict. I therefore include a dichotomous indicator that equals 1 if a group is listed as *territorial* in the original data, and a 0 otherwise. I expect the territorial groups to be less likely to be defeated in any

given year. Another category of groups is classified as *regime change*. Many terrorist and insurgent groups target both the United States and their host governments. Recipient/host governments that are directly threatened by a terrorist group may be less willing to play the dangerous game of exploiting the threat they pose in return for future aid concessions. To account for this, I include a binary variable for these groups and anticipate that they will be more likely to be defeated by the government in a given year, all else equal. A third type of group, referred to as *status quo*, are often right-wing groups, or paramilitary groups that fight alongside the regime against other terrorist/rebel groups. Examples include the AUC in Colombia or the UDA in Northern Ireland. Because these groups often oppose the same groups that the regime does, the host government may be less willing to crack down on them. I assign a binary variable to groups labeled *status quo* in the data. I also control for the number of other groups present in the country.⁴

Geographical attributes of the host state may affect the strength of terrorist groups and the ability of the state to pursue them. In large countries, or countries with mountainous terrain, it may be easier for groups to establish bases in remote or inaccessible corners of the country, making them harder to eliminate. I incorporate measures of country size and terrain ruggedness—both taken from Nunn and Puga (2012)—in both the duration and count models.

Another factor commonly thought to influence terrorist group durability is whether or not a group receives support from a state sponsor. Such support may include the provision of weapons, financing, training, safe havens, or other logistical support meant to increase the capacity and longevity of a group. This is particularly common in cases of rivalry, as states often give support rebel/terrorist groups that target a rival regime (Salehyan, 2008). In the duration models, I use a binary variable, taken from Carter (2012), in cases where a group is *sponsored* by a state. I also include an indicator for whether or not the host state is involved in an interstate rivalry, taken from Thompson and Dreyer (2011).

For the attack count models, I also include a civil war variable in the count models to indicate whether a recipient was involved in a civil conflict during a particular year, as terrorism is often used as a tactic by rebel groups during domestic conflicts (Findley and Young, 2011; Stanton,

⁴These “group orientation” variables are non-exhaustive. There are several other group types in the data, but there is no reason to expect religious- or revolutionary groups to be more or less likely to fail.

2013). I take the civil war data from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Themner and Wallensteen, 2012), which covers the entire time period of this analysis.

I also control for the occurrence of a coup in a given year, as these are frequently associated with elevated levels of instability and terrorism. The aftermath of recent coups in Mali and Egypt are cases in point. Borrowing data from Powell and Thyne (2011), I include a coup indicator in each attack-count model.

To control for regional effects, I include indicators for each of the six continents in the random effects estimations for both the duration and attack-count models.

Finally, I model time dependence in the group duration models by following Carter and Signorino (2010) with the inclusion of a variable counting the number of years since the group was established, as well as squared and cubic terms of this variable. This method avoids estimation problems that may result from time dummies and is easier to implement and interpret than splines.

Multicollinearity

Below are correlation plots of the variables used in both the duration and count models in the main text. The plots suggest that multicollinearity is not a worry for the results presented in Tables 1 and 2 in the main text (the darker the blue, the stronger the positive correlation; darker red signifies a stronger negative correlation). VIF tests on each of the models in those tables support this conclusion, as none of the variance inflation factors on non-interaction variables exceed five.

Base models

Lagged aid

This section contains the results of duration and count models estimated using the natural log of each category of aid, lagged one year, as opposed to the 5-year moving average I use in the main text. The findings from Tables 1 and 2 in the main analysis generally hold. Based on estimates in Tables 10 and 11, levels of security and total aid continue to significantly increase both group duration and terrorist attacks in personalist regimes. Interestingly, aid levels have a strongly negative impact on both types of terrorist attacks in non-personalist regimes.

Full tables from main analysis

To use space more efficiently in the main text, I omitted estimates for time polynomials and continent indicators from Tables 1 and 2. Tables 12 and 13 contain estimates for all covariates used in the duration and count models.

Pre- & post-911 years separately

In this section, I examine the possibility that the findings related to the effect of aid on terrorism are driven by the increased reliance on foreign aid as a policy instrument during the so-called “war on terror” launched by the Bush administration in the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks. It may be the case that after 2001, some governments saw an opportunity to profit from the United States’ renewed obsession with terrorism. However, while there are some differences, Tables 14 and 15 suggest that the main findings are not exclusively artifacts of the post-9/11 period. Both total aid and security aid lengthen terrorist group duration in personalist regimes pre- and post-2001. In the count models, both types of aid strongly increase anti-US terrorist attacks in personalist regimes after 2001; the effect is still positive before 2002, but loses statistical significance. However, this is not completely at odds with the argument in the paper, especially if one believes that the US became more focused on terrorism after 2001 than it was before: as the donor becomes more vested in achieving a certain outcome, the recipient becomes more able to exploit the donor’s interest.

Interestingly, average aid over 5 years has a strong negative effect on anti-US terrorism in non-personalist regimes after 2001, which also supports the argument made in the paper. While personalist regimes viewed terrorism as a cash cow, others saw it as a serious threat to their interests and used US assistance to combat it effectively.

A few other notable differences: military regimes before 2002 were more susceptible to terrorism relative to other regimes—both in terms of group duration and number of attacks—though this effect disappears after 2001.

I elect not to present these results in the main text for a couple of reasons. First, it is my belief that the United States has always placed a strong emphasis on counterterrorism in its foreign policy, and this only became more apparent after 2001 due to the September 11 attacks and subsequent

wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Second, as mentioned above, terrorism data (or any other event data for that matter) before the mid-2000s should be taken with a grain of salt due to massive improvements in data collection methodology over the past 10-15 years. Thus, any finding/non-finding based on event data from before 2002 should be taken with a grain of salt.

Reduced-form Equations for 2-Stage Residual Inclusion Estimation

Here, I use a number of exogenous independent variables to predict aid allocation. Following Terza, Basu and Rathouz (2008), residuals from this OLS estimation were used as independent variables in the attack-count models (Table 2 in the main text) to account for any bias resulting from endogeneity between aid and terrorism.

Excluding civil wars

Another possible objection to my results is that ongoing civil wars explain these findings. In other words, one might argue that most terrorist attacks take place during civil wars, or that the pattern of attacks in civil wars is such that my findings regarding personalism and U.S. foreign aid are an artifact of civil wars. I include a civil war variable in all of the main models in the paper to allow for this.

While the effect of the civil war variable is always large and positive in the count models in the main text, I replicate the findings from Table 2 in the main text, but with civil war-years removed from the sample. Estimates are presented in Table 17, and it is clear that the main attack-count findings are not driven by civil war violence.

Dealing with excess zeroes and overdispersion

The terrorist attacks data are overdispersed and contain a large percentage of zeros due to the fact that terrorism is a rare occurrence in many countries. Previous studies of terrorism (e.g., (Drakos and Gofas, 2006; Findley, Piazza and Young, 2012)) have dealt with this by estimating zero-inflated models.⁵ However, these types of models may be inappropriate for studies of terrorism, as they

⁵The Vuong test statistic in this case is large and significant, indicating that the zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) fits the data better than does the negative binomial.

assume that some countries are simply immune to terrorist attacks. This is obviously not the case, since all countries are susceptible to some degree of terrorism.

For this reason, the hurdle model may be more theoretically appropriate here (though I present both the ZINB and hurdle). The occurrence of zeros and the count process are modeled separately, but unlike zero-inflated count models, the hurdle model does not assume that there are two types of zeros. Once the “hurdle” of experiencing a terrorist attack is crossed, the observed data are assumed to be the result of a count process (Cameron and Trivedi, 2013). I use the same set of covariates to specify both stages, which is common practice in zero-inflated count models. Results of these models are presented in Tables 18 and 19.

Exclude top three aid outliers

The following tables replicate the main results without Israel, Afghanistan, and Egypt—the top three recipients of US foreign aid in the sample—to ensure that outliers are not driving the findings.

Country and year fixed-effects

This section presents results containing both country- and year-fixed effects in order to account for unmodeled country- and year-level effects.

Possible mitigating effects of natural resource wealth

Personalist dictatorships are unique in how heavily they depend upon sources of nontax revenue such as foreign aid to sustain their regimes. However, the need for a continual flow of foreign aid may be mitigated if a personalist leader is able to draw upon other forms of nontax revenue, such as natural resource rents. In fact, Girod (2012) makes exactly this argument, finding that development aid in post-war contexts is more effective among recipients who are resource-poor. Aid is more likely to be put to good use by these recipients because they are ostensibly more desperate for income from aid, and thus will be less inclined to run the risk of donors withdrawing. As a check to determine whether the main argument in this paper holds among recipients with access to large flows of natural resource rents, I use data on oil and gas revenues from Ross and

Mahdavi (2015) and replicate the main analyses on a subsample of observations in the top 15% in terms of resource wealth (as measured by resource revenues as a percentage of GDP) in Tables 22 and 23. Even among the most resource-rich countries, the results for both the duration and count models are robust, although they weaken a bit in the duration models. Thoroughly exploring the substitutability among various sources of nontax revenue is beyond the scope of this paper, although this is an interesting question that should be pursued in future research.

Competing risks

In the duration models presented in the main text, I group police and splintering failures together, and assume group failure is a binary outcome: either the groups fail due to one of these two reasons, or they do not fail at all. However, this does not account for the three other types of failure for which groups in the Jones & Libicki data are at risk: victory; defeat by external military force; and entry into politics. To control for the possibility that all of these groups are theoretically at risk for any one of these mutually exclusive failure events, I re-estimate the duration model from the main text in a competing risks framework, in which police/splintering is considered the failure event of interest, and the other three forms of failure are the competing events. Results are presented in Table 24 as subhazard ratios. A subhazard ratio below 1 means that increases in that variable make failure less likely, while a ratio greater than 1 means the opposite.

Although statistical significance is slightly diminished in the security aid model, the results are substantively the same in both: controlling for the risk of competing alternative failure types, groups based in high aid-receiving personalist regimes are less likely to fail due to state actions. Because SHRs are difficult to interpret, Figure 11 displays the substantive effects of US aid on risk of state-induced group failure while also allowing groups to fail for other reasons. Briefly, the plot in Figure 11 tells us that groups based in states governed by personalist regimes that receive \$3.2 million per year fail at roughly twice the rate of analogous groups in states receiving \$65 million. These findings provide further support for Hypothesis 1 in the main text.

References

- Byman, Daniel. 2005. *Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Cameron, Colin and Pravin K. Trivedi. 2013. *Regression Analysis of Count Data, 2nd Edition*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Carter, David B. 2012. "Blessing or curse? State support for terrorist groups." *International Organization* 66(1):129–151.
- Carter, David B. and Curtis S. Signorino. 2010. "Back to the future: Modeling temporal dependence in binary data." *Political Analysis* 18(3):271–292.
- Drakos, Konstantinos and Andreas Gofas. 2006. "In Search of the Average Transnational Terrorist Attack Venue." *Defense and Peace Economics* 17(2):73–93.
- Fearon, James D. 2004. "Why do some civil wars last so much longer than others?" *Journal of Peace Research* 41 (3):275–301.
- Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin. 2003. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." *The American Political Science Review* 97(1):75–90.
- Findley, Michael, James A. Piazza and Joseph K. Young. 2012. "Games rivals play: Terrorism in international rivalries." *Journal of Politics* 74(1):235–248.
- Findley, Michael and Joseph K. Young. 2011. "Terrorism and Civil War: A Spatial and Temporal Approach to a Conceptual Problem." *Manuscript* .
- Geddes, Barbara. 2003. *Paradigms and Sandcastles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright and Erica Frantz. 2014. "Autocratic breakdown and regime transitions: A new data set." *Perspectives on Politics* 12(1).
- Girod, Desha M. 2012. "Effective foreign aid following civil war: The nonstrategic-desperation hypothesis." *American Journal of Political Science* 56(1):188–201.
- Jones, Seth G. and Martin C. Libicki. 2008. *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qaeda*. Washington, D.C.: RAND Corporation.
- Maddison, Angus. 2012. "Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1-2008 AD." <http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm>.
- Nunn, Nathan and Diego Puga. 2012. "Ruggedness: The blessing of bad geography in Africa." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 94(1):20–36.
- Piazza, James A. and Matthew Wilson. 2013. "Autocracies and terrorism: Conditioning effects of authoritarian regime type on terrorism." *American Journal of Political Science* 57(4):941–955.
- Pillar, Paul R. 2004. *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
- Powell, Jonathan and Clayton Thyne. 2011. "Global instances of coups from 1950-present." *Journal of Peace Research* 48(2):249–259.

- Ross, Michael and Paasha Mahdavi. 2015. "Oil and gas data, 1932-2014." *Harvard Dataverse* DOI:10.7910/DVN/ZTPW0Y.
- Salehyan, Idea. 2008. "No Shelter Here: Rebel Sanctuaries and International Conflict." *Journal of Politics* 20(1):54–66.
- Stanton, Jessica. 2013. "Terrorism in the Context of Civil War." *Journal of Politics* 75(4):1009–1022.
- START. 2012. "Global Terrorism Database." <http://www.start.umd.edu/start/>.
- Stepan, Alfred. 1971. *The Military in Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Svolik, Milan. 2012. *The politics of authoritarian rule*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Terza, Joseph V., Anirban Basu and Paul J. Rathouz. 2008. "Two-Stage Residual Inclusion Estimation: Addressing Endogeneity in Health Econometric Modeling." *Journal of Health Economics* 27(3):531–543.
- Themner, Lotta and Peter Wallensteen. 2012. "Armed Conflict, 1946-2011." *Journal of Peace Research* 49(4):565–575.
- Thompson, William R. and David Dreyer. 2011. *Handbook of Interstate Rivalry, 1494-2010*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- United States Agency for International Development. 2014. "USAID Greenbook: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants." <http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/data/>.
- Whitten-Woodring, Jennifer and Douglas A. Van Belle. 2014. *Historical Guide to World Media Freedom: A Country-by-Country Analysis*. Washington, D.C.: Sage/CQ Press.
- World Bank. 2014. "World Development Indicators Database." <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators>.
- Wright, Joseph. 2008. "To invest or insure? How authoritarian time horizons impact foreign aid effectiveness." *Comparative Political Studies* 41(7):971–1000.

Table 5: Summary of U.S. Aid Variables

	Group-Year Data (duration models)				Country-Year Data (count models)			
	Minimum	Mean	Maximum	σ	Minimum	Mean	Maximum	σ
Economic	0	\$361,400,000	\$14,030,000,000	\$984,030,706	0	\$118,800,000	\$30,640,000,000	\$561,432,739
Military	0	\$348,700,000	\$10,220,000,000	\$1,023,416,402	0	\$79,350,000	\$12,800,000,000	\$502,263,292
Defense	0	\$72,740,000	\$7,184,000,000	\$605,747,642	—	—	—	—
Total	0	\$783,700,000	\$17,670,000,000	\$2,166,268,743	0	\$198,400,000	\$30,640,000,000	\$874,971,583
Econ p.c.	0	\$35.03	\$1,985.00	\$113.18	0	\$23.67	\$18,400.00	\$257.65
Military p.c.	0	\$56.39	\$2,777.00	\$232.04	0	\$7.31	\$2,835.00	\$62.88
Total p.c.	0	\$94.90	\$3,276.00	\$325.42	0	\$31.10	\$18,400.00	\$269.82




Figure 3: Distribution of aid by regime type




Figure 4: Distribution of aid variables: Country-year data




Figure 5: Distribution of aid variables: Group-year data




Figure 6: Distribution of aid moving averages: Country-year data




Figure 7: Distribution of aid moving averages: Group-year data

Table 6: Summary of Regime Type Variables

	Group-Year Data (duration models) 1968–2006		Country-Year Data (count models) 1970–2010	
	# of observations	% of total	# of observations	% of total
Democracy	3,662	58.33	2,315	52.8
Personalist	665	11.26	889	12.6
Single Party	822	13.71	1,501	6.4
Military	826	13.39	431	23.1
Monarchy	119	2.49	330	5.0




Figure 8: Frequency of personalist dictatorships, 1946-2010 (from Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014))

Table 7: Personalist dictatorships, 1970–2010

Afghanistan	1974-78; 2010-
Armenia	1994-98; 1999-
Azerbaijan	1992; 1994-
Bangladesh	1976-82; 1983-1990
Belarus	1995-
Benin	1973-1990
Burkina Faso	1967-80; 1983-87; 1988-
Cambodia	1971-75
Cameroon	1984-
Central African Rep.	1966-81; 2004-
Chad	1983-91
Rep. Congo	1998-
DR Congo	1961-98
Dominican Republic	1967-78
Ecuador	1971-72
Gambia	1995-
Georgia	1992-2003
Ghana	1982-2000
Guinea	1985-2010
Guinea-Bissau	1981-99; 2003
Haiti	1951-1986; 2000-2004
Iraq	1980-2003
Ivory Coast	2000-2001
Kazakhstan	1992-present
Kyrgyzstan	1992-2012
Liberia	1981-90; 1998-2003
Libya	1970-
Madagascar	1976-93; 2010-
Malawi	1965-94
Mali	1969-91
Mauritania	1961-2005; 2009-
Nicaragua	1937-79
Niger	1997-99
Pakistan	1976-77
Peru	1993-2000
Philippines	1973-86
Portugal	1927-74
Russia	1994-
Sierra Leone	1998
Somalia	1970-91
Spain	1940-76
Sudan	1970-85; 1990-
Tajikistan	1992-
Togo	1964-
Uganda	1967-79; 1981-85; 1987-
Venezuela	2006-
Yemen	1968-74; 1979-

Figure 9: Correlation plot: Country-year data (1970-2010)




Figure 10: Correlation Plot: Jones & Libicki group-year data (1970-2006)




Table 8: Base specifications, duration models

	Security	Total	Security	Total
Aid, personalist regime	-0.011 (0.038)	-0.015 (0.037)	-0.143** (0.064)	-0.184** (0.066)
Aid, non-personalist regime	-0.025** (0.009)	-0.037** (0.009)	0.016 (0.024)	0.041 (0.026)
Personalist regime, no aid	-0.428 (0.515)	-0.302 (0.607)	0.626 (0.887)	1.597 (0.999)
t	-0.521** (0.053)	-0.512** (0.052)	-0.446** (0.054)	-0.449** (0.054)
t ²	0.028** (0.004)	0.028** (0.004)	0.024** (0.004)	0.024** (0.004)
t ³	-0.0004** (0.0001)	-0.0004** (0.0001)	-0.0004** (0.0001)	-0.0004** (0.0001)
Constant	-1.528** (0.153)	-1.298** (0.164)	1.029 (1.178)	1.034 (1.178)
Observations	6,329	6,329	6,329	6,329
Country fixed effects			✓	✓
Log Likelihood	-802.988	-798.281	-717.717	-716.527

*p<0.1; **p<0.05

Table 9: Base specifications, count models

	Anti-US attacks				Non-US attacks			
	Security	Security	Total	Total	Security	Security	Total	Total
Aid to personalist regime	0.077** (0.028)	0.069** (0.025)	0.356** (0.078)	0.317** (0.077)	0.020** (0.012)	0.020** (0.009)	0.075** (0.018)	0.074** (0.018)
Aid, non-personalist regime	0.020** (0.006)	0.016** (0.022)	-0.014** (0.007)	-0.019** (0.007)	0.003 (0.002)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.031** (0.003)	-0.032** (0.003)
Personalist regime, no aid	-1.523** (0.408)	-1.386** (0.393)	-6.880** (1.468)	-6.107** (1.439)	-0.423** (0.130)	-0.418** (0.130)	-1.422** (0.324)	-1.411** (0.322)
Constant	-1.991** (0.096)	-1.940** (0.096)	-1.502** (0.131)	-1.420** (0.131)	-1.669** (0.042)	-1.661** (0.042)	-1.153** (0.058)	-1.132** (0.058)
Observations	7,220	5,776	7,220	5,776	7,220	7,105	7,220	7,105
Country random effects	✓		✓		✓		✓	
Country fixed effects		✓		✓		✓		✓

*p<0.1; **p<0.05

Table 10: Replication of group duration models (Table 1 in main text) using 1-year lagged values of aid

	Security aid		Economic aid		Total aid	
Aid to personalist regime	-0.117*	-0.099**	-0.097	-0.058	-0.231**	-0.097**
	(0.062)	(0.041)	(0.071)	(0.043)	(0.079)	(0.043)
Aid, non-personalist regime	-0.009	0.021	0.011	0.013	0.023	0.023
	(0.026)	(0.014)	(0.024)	(0.016)	(0.028)	(0.015)
Personalist regime, no aid	0.326	0.275	0.201	-0.017	2.182*	0.591
	(0.895)	(0.547)	(0.947)	(0.662)	(1.129)	(0.702)
Democracy	-0.531	-0.685**	-0.350	-0.564**	-0.616	-0.626**
	(0.502)	(0.256)	(0.484)	(0.247)	(0.513)	(0.251)
Military regime	-1.413**	-0.905**	-1.186*	-0.856**	-1.491**	-0.898**
	(0.709)	(0.400)	(0.694)	(0.397)	(0.721)	(0.399)
ln(GDP per capita)	0.070	0.381**	0.101	0.359**	-0.101	0.383**
	(0.502)	(0.121)	(0.501)	(0.123)	(0.517)	(0.126)
ln(population)	2.849**	-0.061	2.664**	-0.115	2.832**	-0.069
	(0.901)	(0.136)	(0.884)	(0.129)	(0.904)	(0.133)
Territorial group	0.479*	0.049	0.452*	0.001	0.461*	0.020
	(0.257)	(0.208)	(0.256)	(0.212)	(0.257)	(0.208)
State-sponsored group	-0.256	-0.201	-0.225	-0.215	-0.285	-0.217
	(0.264)	(0.243)	(0.262)	(0.242)	(0.265)	(0.243)
Regime-change group	0.403*	0.213	0.375	0.226	0.380	0.221
	(0.232)	(0.190)	(0.232)	(0.190)	(0.232)	(0.190)
Status-quo group	-0.172	-0.674	-0.166	-0.694	-0.203	-0.671
	(0.677)	(0.625)	(0.677)	(0.626)	(0.678)	(0.625)
Post-911	-0.085	-0.067	-0.134	-0.062	-0.067	-0.063
	(0.245)	(0.207)	(0.245)	(0.206)	(0.246)	(0.205)
Cold War	0.282	-0.070	0.229	-0.112	0.175	-0.095
	(0.275)	(0.183)	(0.274)	(0.182)	(0.277)	(0.182)
Recipient rivalry	0.064	-0.394**	-0.032	-0.307*	-0.032	-0.375*
	(0.607)	(0.194)	(0.605)	(0.183)	(0.614)	(0.192)
Terrain ruggedness	—	0.102	—	0.097	—	0.091
		(0.128)		(0.127)		(0.129)
Country size	—	0.069	—	0.076	—	0.058
		(0.112)		(0.111)		(0.112)
Constant	-47.616**	-3.227	-44.913**	-2.300	-45.423**	-3.012
	(15.391)	(2.340)	(15.200)	(2.260)	(15.399)	(2.355)
Observations	6,009	6,009	6,009	6,009	6,009	6,009
Country fixed effects	✓		✓		✓	
Regional dummies		✓		✓		✓
Log Likelihood	-685.251	-737.780	-686.765	-739.799	-683.739	-738.253

*p<0.1; **p<0.05

Cubic time polynomials were included in each model but are not shown here

Table 11: Replication of count models (Table 2, main text) using 1-year lagged values of aid

	Anti-US attacks			Non-US attacks		
	Security	Total	Total	Security	Total	Total
Aid to personalist regime	0.102** (0.028)	0.048* (0.026)	0.125** (0.060)	0.045** (0.012)	0.062** (0.025)	0.017 (0.023)
Aid, non-personalist regime	-0.011 (0.022)	0.021 (0.022)	-1.060** (0.086)	-0.035** (0.013)	0.344** (0.014)	-0.622* (0.047)
Personalist regime, no aid	-2.073** (0.462)	-0.773** (0.385)	-2.748** (1.111)	-1.188** (0.205)	-1.796** (0.458)	-0.551 (0.405)
Democracy	-0.095 (0.218)	-0.280* (0.162)	-0.140 (0.207)	-0.115 (0.123)	-0.057 (0.124)	-0.258** (0.100)
Military regime	0.275 (0.237)	0.251 (0.187)	0.307 (0.226)	0.462** (0.140)	0.326** (0.142)	0.517** (0.123)
ln(GDP per capita)	0.564** (0.142)	0.276** (0.058)	1.072** (0.137)	0.787** (0.082)	0.609** (0.087)	0.911** (0.048)
ln(population)	1.490** (0.178)	0.577** (0.058)	0.544** (0.175)	4.023** (0.116)	1.028** (0.036)	1.236** (0.038)
Coup	0.113 (0.133)	0.018 (0.150)		0.070 (0.085)	-0.018 (0.094)	
Recipient rivalry			1.586** (0.160)		1.369** (0.102)	0.685** (0.069)
Civil war	1.096** (0.142)	1.243** (0.123)	1.005** (0.137)	1.978** (0.086)	1.806** (0.087)	2.404** (0.081)
Press censorship	0.023 (0.083)	-0.012 (0.066)	0.077 (0.078)	0.071 (0.049)	-0.078* (0.050)	-0.078* (0.041)
Ruggedness		0.509** (0.058)			0.464** (0.032)	0.393** (0.031)
Country size		-0.118** (0.048)	-0.182** (0.045)		-0.368** (0.028)	-0.411** (0.027)
Constant	-35.127** (2.792)	-12.344** (0.952)	-26.546** (2.606)	-76.538** (1.790)	-14.347** (1.848)	-25.307** (0.981)
Observations	6,448	6,448	6,456	6,448	6,456	6,456
Country fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Continent dummies						
Log Likelihood	-3,076.330	-3,474.262	-2,962.216	-11,882.540	-12,915.140	-12,801.450

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05

Table 12: Full version of main text Table 1

<i>Aid type</i>	Security		Economic		Total	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
<i>Aid to personalist regime</i>	-0.198** (0.076)	-0.111** (0.042)	-0.271** (0.080)	-0.107* (0.045)	-0.255** (0.077)	-0.102* (0.042)
<i>Aid to non – personalist regime</i>	-0.008 (0.028)	0.018 (0.014)	0.045 (0.026)	0.027 (0.017)	0.037 (0.029)	0.023 (0.016)
<i>Personalist regime, no aid</i>	1.415 (1.028)	0.581 (0.604)	2.725* (1.080)	0.720 (0.709)	2.717* (1.122)	0.718 (0.701)
<i>Democracy</i>	-0.631 (0.513)	-0.673** (0.254)	-0.608 (0.516)	-0.605* (0.249)	-0.640 (0.517)	-0.620* (0.250)
<i>Military regime</i>	-1.531* (0.721)	-0.918* (0.399)	-1.478* (0.722)	-0.890* (0.398)	-1.510* (0.725)	-0.899* (0.399)
<i>ln(GDP per cap)</i>	0.010 (0.492)	0.353** (0.120)	-0.079 (0.515)	0.364** (0.124)	-0.076 (0.517)	0.359** (0.125)
<i>ln(population)</i>	2.944** (0.906)	-0.067 (0.136)	2.805** (0.898)	-0.090 (0.132)	2.812** (0.905)	-0.079 (0.133)
<i>Territorial group</i>	0.475 (0.257)	0.051 (0.208)	0.447 (0.257)	-0.006 (0.210)	0.449 (0.257)	0.031 (0.208)
<i>State sponsored</i>	-0.300 (0.267)	-0.217 (0.243)	-0.289 (0.265)	-0.231 (0.243)	-0.292 (0.266)	-0.224 (0.243)
<i>Regime change group</i>	0.411 (0.232)	0.211 (0.190)	0.366 (0.233)	0.198 (0.191)	0.369 (0.233)	0.216 (0.190)
<i>Status quo group</i>	-0.156 (0.678)	-0.706 (0.627)	-0.222 (0.680)	-0.721 (0.628)	-0.223 (0.680)	-0.698 (0.627)
<i>Post – 911</i>	-0.060 (0.245)	-0.039 (0.205)	-0.090 (0.246)	-0.074 (0.206)	-0.057 (0.246)	-0.050 (0.204)
<i>Cold war</i>	0.260 (0.273)	-0.079 (0.183)	0.134 (0.278)	-0.114 (0.182)	0.144 (0.277)	-0.105 (0.182)
<i>Rivalry</i>	0.102 (0.598)	-0.366 (0.193)	-0.166 (0.615)	-0.349 (0.186)	-0.038 (0.604)	-0.385* (0.195)
<i>Country size</i>		0.064 (0.112)		0.063 (0.112)		0.058 (0.112)
<i>Ruggedness</i>		0.110 (0.128)		0.091 (0.129)		0.091 (0.130)
<i>Africa</i>		-0.834 (0.461)		-0.761 (0.455)		-0.777 (0.457)
<i>Asia</i>		-0.333 (0.386)		-0.301 (0.384)		-0.318 (0.386)
<i>Europe</i>		0.237 (0.382)		0.368 (0.399)		0.275 (0.384)
<i>Oceania</i>		0.966 (1.241)		1.103 (1.247)		1.025 (1.241)
<i>North America</i>		-1.211* (0.536)		-1.148* (0.527)		-1.175* (0.530)
<i>South America</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>t</i>	-0.494** (0.060)	-0.523** (0.058)	-0.497** (0.060)	-0.522** (0.058)	-0.496** (0.060)	-0.522** (0.058)
<i>t²</i>	0.028** (0.005)	0.030** (0.005)	0.029** (0.005)	0.030** (0.005)	0.028** (0.005)	0.030** (0.005)
<i>t³</i>	-0.0005** (0.0001)	-0.001** (0.0001)	-0.0005** (0.0001)	-0.001** (0.0001)	-0.0005** (0.0001)	-0.001** (0.0001)
Observations	5,986	5,986	5,986	5,986	5,986	5,986
Log Likelihood	-682.944	-736.820	-682.010	-737.282	-682.367	-737.346
Country fixed effects	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$

Table 13: Full version of main text Table 2

Aid type	Non-US attacks				Anti-US attacks			
	Security		Total		Security		Total	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
<i>Aid to personalist regime</i>	0.040** (0.014)	0.038** (0.015)	0.176** (0.027)	0.071* (0.028)	0.195** (0.038)	0.088* (0.040)	0.518** (0.116)	0.338* (0.145)
<i>Aid to non – personalist regime</i>	-0.006 (0.008)	0.007 (0.008)	-0.010 (0.010)	-0.031** (0.012)	0.055** (0.013)	0.057** (0.013)	-0.008 (0.019)	0.007 (0.029)
<i>Personalist regime, no aid</i>	-0.794** (0.233)	-0.752** (0.208)	-3.429** (0.490)	-1.489** (0.490)	-3.652** (0.631)	-1.256** (0.641)	-10.142** (2.197)	-6.312** (2.792)
<i>Democracy</i>	0.139 (0.117)	-0.309** (0.101)	0.083 (0.117)	-0.337** (0.100)	-0.034 (0.223)	-0.094 (0.162)	0.014 (0.220)	-0.306 (0.323)
<i>Military regime</i>	0.776** (0.133)	0.562** (0.121)	0.711** (0.133)	0.542** (0.120)	0.265 (0.240)	0.340 (0.182)	0.264 (0.236)	0.180 (0.294)
<i>ln(GDP per cap)</i>	1.612** (0.089)	0.298** (0.035)	1.725** (0.092)	0.377** (0.039)	1.627** (0.175)	0.475** (0.057)	1.828** (0.181)	0.501** (0.172)
<i>ln(population)</i>	5.419** (0.157)	0.918** (0.033)	5.284** (0.157)	0.946** (0.033)	3.285** (0.267)	0.674** (0.056)	3.344** (0.262)	0.670** (0.170)
<i>Civil war</i>	1.824** (0.080)	2.634** (0.080)	1.817** (0.080)	2.614** (0.080)	0.856** (0.140)	1.197** (0.120)	0.790** (0.139)	1.254** (0.233)
<i>Coup</i>	0.069 (0.081)	-0.040 (0.093)	0.063 (0.081)	-0.046 (0.092)	0.162 (0.128)	0.078 (0.150)	0.151 (0.127)	0.078 (0.155)
<i>Post. – 911</i>	-1.061** (0.103)	-0.376** (0.129)	-1.140** (0.104)	-0.452** (0.129)	-0.524* (0.209)	-0.367 (0.223)	-0.673** (0.211)	0.389 (0.331)
<i>Cold war</i>	-0.108 (0.085)	-1.252** (0.085)	-0.106 (0.085)	-1.217** (0.085)	0.224 (0.141)	-0.520** (0.131)	0.339* (0.141)	-0.514** (0.183)
<i>Media censorship</i>	-0.101* (0.048)	-0.041 (0.041)	-0.092 (0.048)	-0.055 (0.041)	-0.088 (0.083)	0.039 (0.066)	-0.079 (0.083)	-0.024 (0.137)
<i>GTD1</i>	1.594** (0.142)	0.347* (0.177)	1.618** (0.143)	0.327 (0.176)	3.163** (0.301)	2.137** (0.304)	3.132** (0.299)	3.132** (0.299)
<i>GTD2</i>	-0.043 (0.102)	-0.569** (0.127)	-0.005 (0.103)	-0.583** (0.127)	1.251** (0.228)	0.731** (0.215)	1.269** (0.228)	1.269** (0.228)
<i>GTD3</i>								
<i>GTD4</i>								
<i>Country size</i>		-0.314** (0.027)		-0.308** (0.027)		-0.172** (0.048)		-0.149 (0.126)
<i>Ruggedness</i>		0.492** (0.031)		0.472** (0.031)		0.475** (0.056)		0.450** (0.139)
<i>Africa</i>		-1.478** (0.130)		-1.465** (0.128)		-1.627** (0.211)		-1.857** (0.418)
<i>Asia</i>		-1.367** (0.130)		-1.307** (0.130)		-1.073** (0.195)		-0.928* (0.404)
<i>Europe</i>		-1.087** (0.129)		-0.990** (0.129)		-1.084** (0.196)		-0.912* (0.442)
<i>North America</i>		-0.704** (0.145)		-0.632** (0.144)		-0.552** (0.211)		-0.443 (0.430)
<i>Oceania</i>		-1.225** (0.256)		-1.152** (0.260)		-0.828 (0.430)		-0.516 (0.588)
<i>South America</i>								
<i>Endogeneity</i>	-0.030** (0.008)	0.005 (0.009)	0.021 (0.012)	0.066** (0.014)	-0.016 (0.014)	0.003 (0.015)	0.079** (0.023)	0.078* (0.034)
<i>Constant</i>	-109.515** (2.884)	-11.449** (0.590)	-108.510** (2.927)	-12.957** (0.668)	-79.263** (5.018)	-16.203** (0.978)	-82.547** (5.013)	-16.813** (2.675)
Observations	6,334	6,334	6,334	6,334	6,334	6,334	6,334	6,334
Country fixed effects	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Log Likelihood	-11,720.680	-12,971.980	-11,721.710	-12,961.260	-2,850.561	-3,346.665	-2,841.298	-3,342.373

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$

Table 14: Separate pre- and post-2001 replication of Table 1 in main text

Aid type:	Pre-2001		Post-2001	
	Security	Total	Security	Total
<i>Intercept</i>	-3.698 (2.543)	-4.195 (2.573)	-1.838 (4.040)	-1.411 (3.733)
<i>Aid to personalist regime</i>	-0.099* (0.054)	-0.109** (0.053)	-0.185** (0.088)	-0.174* (0.093)
<i>Aid to non – personalist regime</i>	0.024 (0.016)	0.034* (0.018)	-0.010 (0.037)	-0.003 (0.041)
<i>Personalist regime, no aid</i>	-0.123 (0.781)	0.236 (0.875)	3.224** (1.398)	3.560** (1.700)
<i>Democracy</i>	-0.723** (0.290)	-0.686** (0.284)	-0.308 (0.699)	-0.106 (0.678)
<i>Military regime</i>	-1.522*** (0.539)	-1.522*** (0.539)	0.552 (0.691)	0.596 (0.685)
<i>ln(GDP per cap)</i>	0.468*** (0.152)	0.508*** (0.160)	0.056 (0.215)	-0.013 (0.218)
<i>ln(population)</i>	-0.169 (0.166)	-0.168 (0.164)	-0.048 (0.285)	-0.043 (0.278)
<i>Territorial group</i>	0.138 (0.239)	0.129 (0.239)	-0.264 (0.458)	-0.347 (0.450)
<i>State sponsorship</i>	-0.442 (0.276)	-0.448 (0.276)	0.865 (0.557)	0.842 (0.563)
<i>Regime change group</i>	0.342 (0.223)	0.328 (0.223)	0.005 (0.404)	0.025 (0.402)
<i>Status quo group</i>	-0.371 (0.643)	-0.376 (0.644)	-15.396 (798.203)	-15.330 (795.902)
<i>Cold War</i>	-0.130 (0.186)	-0.143 (0.186)	—	—
<i>Country size</i>	0.134 (0.135)	0.130 (0.136)	0.076 (0.257)	0.049 (0.260)
Observations	4,663	4,663	1,323	1,323
Log Likelihood	-551.825	-551.040	-158.972	-160.614

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Continent indicators and time polynomials were included in the estimation but are not shown here

Table 15: Pre- and post-2001 replication of Table 2 in main text (with country fixed effects)

	Non-US attacks			Anti-US attacks		
	Pre-2001	Post-2001	Total	Pre-2001	Post-2001	Total
<i>Aid to personalist regime</i>	0.058*** (0.017)	0.013 (0.031)	0.091*** (0.034)	0.021 (0.038)	0.189** (0.080)	0.103 (0.094)
<i>Aid to non – personalist regime</i>	-0.006 (0.009)	-0.015 (0.020)	-0.020* (0.011)	0.052*** (0.015)	0.009 (0.024)	-0.011 (0.020)
<i>Personalist regime, no aid</i>	-0.985*** (0.289)	-0.659 (0.609)	-1.944*** (0.616)	-0.480 (0.661)	-3.968*** (1.509)	-2.025 (1.765)
<i>Democracy</i>	0.227 (0.147)	0.091 (0.255)	0.091 (0.148)	0.175 (0.267)	0.202 (0.264)	0.202 (0.702)
<i>Military regime</i>	0.748*** (0.156)	-0.170 (0.413)	0.600*** (0.156)	0.363 (0.272)	0.358 (0.270)	-1.488 (0.932)
<i>ln(GDP per cap)</i>	1.726*** (0.112)	1.155*** (0.236)	1.909*** (0.117)	1.624*** (0.194)	1.080*** (0.236)	0.014 (0.497)
<i>ln(population)</i>	5.604*** (0.186)	1.972*** (0.468)	5.532*** (0.187)	2.918*** (0.284)	2.954*** (0.281)	-1.346 (0.912)
<i>Coup</i>	0.118 (0.087)	0.485*** (0.168)	0.090 (0.087)	0.136 (0.135)	0.131 (0.135)	0.502 (0.658)
<i>Civil war</i>	1.654*** (0.096)	1.369*** (0.132)	1.631*** (0.096)	0.950*** (0.158)	0.922*** (0.158)	-0.153 (0.311)
<i>Cold War</i>	0.199** (0.090)	0.231** (0.091)	0.231** (0.091)	0.547*** (0.148)	0.606*** (0.147)	
<i>Media censorship</i>	-0.069 (0.057)	0.030 (0.127)	-0.025 (0.058)	-0.031 (0.094)	-0.029 (0.095)	-0.003 (0.339)
<i>Endogeneity bias</i>	-0.038*** (0.010)	0.001 (0.014)	0.036*** (0.014)	-0.030** (0.015)	0.063*** (0.025)	0.183** (0.088)
Observations	4,949	1,377	4,949	4,949	1,377	1,377
Log Likelihood	-8,862.955	-2,416.164	-8,873.629	-2,399.047	-2,399.056	-338.788

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 16: OLS results – Aid Allocation

	Economic Aid	Military Aid	Total Aid
<i>Lagged Aid</i>	0.80* [0.02]	0.87* [0.01]	0.83* [0.02]
<i>ln(population)</i>	0.01 [0.06]	0.07 [0.05]	0.02 [0.05]
<i>ln(GDP)_{t-1}</i>	-0.58* [0.12]	-0.20* [0.07]	-0.45* [0.09]
<i>Cold War</i>	-0.37* [0.11]	-0.20 [0.10]	-0.26* [0.09]
<i>Post 911</i>	0.47* [0.11]	0.12 [0.15]	0.38* [0.09]
<i>Africa</i>	0.62 [0.41]	0.13 [0.22]	0.51 [0.33]
<i>Asia</i>	0.58 [0.44]	0.42 [0.25]	0.53 [0.36]
<i>Europe</i>	0.01 [0.43]	0.38 [0.25]	0.21 [0.37]
<i>Oceania</i>	—	—	—
<i>North America</i>	1.15* [0.43]	0.71* [0.22]	0.95* [0.35]
<i>South America</i>	1.37* [0.40]	0.92* [0.21]	1.16* [0.34]
<i>Ruggedness</i>	0.12* [0.06]	0.08* [0.04]	0.08 [0.04]
<i>Imports</i>	0.00 [0.00]	-0.00 [0.00]	0.00 [0.00]
<i>Exports</i>	-0.00 [0.00]	-0.00 [0.00]	-0.00 [0.00]
<i>ln(gemstone extraction)</i>	-0.01 [0.02]	-0.01 [0.02]	-0.01 [0.03]
<i>ln(country size)</i>	0.03 [0.05]	-0.02 [0.03]	-0.01 [0.04]
<i>Constant</i>	6.57* [1.27]	1.83* [0.90]	5.48* [1.00]
N	7,728	7,728	7,728
R ²	0.79	0.79	0.80

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

Numbers in brackets are standard errors clustered by country

Table 17: Attack-count models excluding ongoing civil war observations

	Anti-US attacks		Non-US attacks	
	Security	Total	Security	Total
Aid, personalist regime	0.280** (0.119)	0.677** (0.216)	0.053** (0.021)	0.128** (0.055)
Aid, non-personalist regime	0.030* (0.016)	-0.022 (0.022)	-0.039** (0.010)	-0.049** (0.012)
Personalist regime, no aid	-5.154** (2.018)	-13.122** (4.051)	-1.124** (0.334)	-2.843** (0.983)
Democracy	0.138 (0.311)	0.031 (0.307)	0.236 (0.161)	0.068 (0.161)
Military regime	0.453 (0.345)	0.392 (0.342)	0.657** (0.191)	0.448** (0.192)
ln(GDP per capita)	0.422** (0.184)	0.426** (0.184)	0.646** (0.097)	0.688** (0.097)
ln(population)	1.731** (0.245)	1.756** (0.244)	3.911** (0.147)	3.720** (0.147)
Recipient rivalry	1.579** (0.223)	1.598** (0.223)	1.641** (0.126)	1.692** (0.128)
Media censorship	-0.016 (0.112)	-0.018 (0.110)	0.052 (0.061)	0.076 (0.062)
Endogeneity bias	-0.056** (0.018)	-0.012 (0.027)	-0.040** (0.010)	-0.016 (0.015)
Constant	-37.893** (3.769)	-38.148** (3.791)	-73.386** (2.284)	-70.356** (2.301)
Observations	5,273	5,273	5,273	5,273
Log Likelihood	-1,915.253	-1,917.414	-7,388.462	-7,404.330
Country fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓

*p<0.1; **p<0.05

Table 18: Zero-inflated negative binomial (count process only)

	Anti-US attacks		Non-US attacks	
	Security	Total	Security	Total
Aid, personalist regime	0.043 (0.043)	0.258** (0.102)	0.032** (0.015)	0.053* (0.028)
Aid, non-personalist regime	0.059** (0.010)	0.042** (0.012)	0.017** (0.005)	0.036** (0.006)
Personalist regime, no aid	-0.517 (0.762)	-4.836** (1.990)	-0.834** (0.232)	-1.317** (0.510)
Democracy	-0.298* (0.181)	-0.190 (0.182)	-0.425** (0.099)	-0.419** (0.097)
Military regime	-0.189 (0.314)	-0.268 (0.229)	0.525** (0.133)	0.550** (0.006)
ln(GDP per capita)	0.044 (0.076)	0.030 (0.083)	0.015 (0.036)	0.054 (0.036)
ln(population)	0.469** (0.081)	0.445** (0.090)	0.889** (0.037)	0.893** (0.037)
Civil war	0.228* (0.142)	0.240* (0.138)	2.314** (0.078)	2.303** (0.077)
Post-911	1.753** (0.325)	1.739** (0.336)	-0.392** (0.117)	-0.392** (0.117)
Cold War	0.268* (0.143)	0.245 (0.154)	-0.392** (0.084)	-0.376 (0.084)
Media censorship	-0.038 (0.087)	0.008 (0.091)	-0.161** (0.045)	-0.197** (0.046)
Country size	-0.145** (0.057)	-0.144** (0.058)	-0.249** (0.030)	-0.243** (0.030)
Ruggedness	0.507** (0.063)	0.530** (0.066)	0.471** (0.032)	0.469** (0.048)
Constant	-7.862** (1.438)	-7.190** (2.132)	-9.308** (0.637)	-10.142** (0.645)
Observations	6,326	6,326	6,326	6,326
Log Likelihood	-3,283.538	-3,303.101	-12,302.95	-12,292.73
Regional dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓

*p<0.1; **p<0.05

Table 19: Hurdle models (count process only)

	Anti-US attacks		Non-US attacks	
	Security	Total	Security	Total
Aid, personalist regime	0.244** (0.082)	0.562** (0.173)	0.060** (0.019)	0.068* (0.036)
Aid, non-personalist regime	0.036 (0.022)	-0.037 (0.024)	-0.006 (0.011)	-0.019 (0.014)
Personalist regime, no aid	-4.782** (1.461)	-11.504** (3.351)	-1.425** (0.282)	-1.806** (0.654)
Democracy	-0.311 (0.270)	-0.366 (0.275)	-0.391** (0.133)	-0.410** (0.130)
Military regime	-0.204 (0.314)	-0.343 (0.316)	0.475** (0.172)	0.514** (0.167)
ln(GDP per capita)	-0.228** (0.110)	-0.129 (0.115)	0.029 (0.049)	0.142** (0.051)
ln(population)	0.138 (0.147)	0.230 (0.151)	0.878** (0.055)	0.934** (0.054)
Civil war	0.105 (0.193)	0.063 (0.193)	2.257** (0.101)	2.220** (0.097)
Post-911	0.426 (0.321)	0.327 (0.327)	-0.582** (0.112)	-0.673** (0.112)
Cold War	0.368** (0.187)	0.533** (0.192)	-0.177* (0.098)	-0.071 (0.096)
Media censorship	0.003 (0.125)	0.014 (0.124)	-0.117* (0.060)	-0.164** (0.062)
Country size	0.072 (0.121)	0.086 (0.122)	-0.289** (0.045)	-0.281** (0.044)
Ruggedness	0.352** (0.129)	0.384** (0.139)	0.547** (0.046)	0.469** (0.048)
Endogeneity bias	0.021 (0.023)	0.115** (0.028)	0.029** (0.012)	0.086** (0.017)
Constant	-8.484** (1.924)	-11.882** (2.132)	-9.260** (0.866)	-11.907** (0.920)
Observations	6,334	6,334	6,334	6,334
Log Likelihood	-3,274.157	-3,271.740	-12,317.360	-12,303.420
Regional dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓

*p<0.1; **p<0.05

Table 20: Attack-count models (excluding Israel, Afghanistan, & Egypt)

	Anti-US attacks		Non-US attacks	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Aid, personalist regime	0.139** (0.038)	0.403** (0.114)	0.058** (0.015)	0.137** (0.029)
Aid, non-personalist regime	0.033** (0.014)	-0.017 (0.020)	-0.023** (0.008)	-0.037** (0.011)
Personalist regime, no aid	-2.796** (0.639)	-8.053** (2.152)	-1.448** (0.245)	-3.153** (0.525)
Democracy	-0.048 (0.227)	-0.011 (0.226)	-0.005 (0.125)	-0.086 (0.126)
Military regime	0.146 (0.247)	0.181 (0.246)	0.496** (0.141)	0.391** (0.143)
ln(GDP per capita)	0.495** (0.150)	0.526** (0.152)	0.681** (0.085)	0.741** (0.085)
ln(population)	1.376** (0.185)	1.345** (0.184)	3.941** (0.119)	3.765** (0.118)
Civil war	0.924** (0.151)	0.885** (0.151)	1.859** (0.088)	1.842** (0.089)
Recipient rivalry	1.494** (0.176)	1.495** (0.175)	1.371** (0.101)	1.420** (0.102)
Media censorship	-0.037 (0.086)	-0.029 (0.086)	-0.013 (0.050)	0.014 (0.051)
Endogeneity bias	-0.028* (0.015)	0.017 (0.023)	-0.037** (0.009)	-0.005 (0.013)
Constant	-32.498** (2.923)	-32.258** (2.919)	-73.997** (1.839)	-71.555** (1.838)
Observations	6,182	6,182	6,182	6,182
Log Likelihood	-2,871.465	-2,869.540	-11,242.740	-11,259.620

*p<0.1; **p<0.05

Table 21: Replication of count models (Table 2, main text) with country- and year fixed-effects

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Anti-US attacks		Non-US attacks	
	Security	Total	Security	Total
Aid to personalist regime	0.152** (0.038)	0.491** (0.115)	0.031** (0.014)	0.147** (0.025)
Aid, non-personalist regime	0.086** (0.014)	0.031* (0.019)	0.021** (0.008)	0.007 (0.010)
Personalist regime, no aid	-3.062** (0.641)	-9.840** (2.180)	-0.713** (0.227)	-2.885** (0.446)
Democracy	-0.132 (0.214)	-0.099 (0.209)	0.032 (0.112)	0.044 (0.110)
Military regime	-0.153 (0.229)	-0.192 (0.224)	0.401** (0.126)	0.381** (0.124)
ln(GDP per capita)	0.468** (0.216)	0.905** (0.219)	-0.125 (0.109)	0.031 (0.108)
ln(population)	2.627** (0.400)	3.037** (0.392)	2.539** (0.218)	2.591** (0.214)
Civil war	0.756** (0.134)	0.739** (0.134)	1.779** (0.076)	1.765** (0.075)
Recipient rivalry	0.794** (0.186)	0.606** (0.183)	0.671** (0.100)	0.594** (0.099)
Media censorship	-0.286** (0.081)	-0.268** (0.080)	-0.227** (0.046)	-0.234** (0.045)
Endogeneity bias	0.010 (0.013)	0.124** (0.022)	-0.010 (0.008)	0.061** (0.012)
Observations	6,334	6,334	6,334	6,334
Log Likelihood	-2,675.888	-2,656.572	-10,808.010	-10,766.230

*p<0.1; **p<0.05

Table 22: Replication of Table 1 (group duration) in main text using only top 15% most resource-wealthy countries

Aid type:	Security	Total
<i>Aid to personalist regime</i>	-0.148 (0.120)	-0.223* (0.131)
<i>Aid to non – personalist regime</i>	-0.073 (0.073)	0.031 (0.034)
<i>Personalist regime, no aid</i>	2.049 (1.719)	3.821* (2.168)
<i>Democracy</i>	-1.165 (1.079)	-0.865 (1.049)
<i>Military regime</i>	—	—
<i>ln(GDP per cap)</i>	-2.153* (1.194)	-2.074* (1.179)
<i>ln(population)</i>	1.375 (2.726)	2.008 (3.166)
<i>Territorial group</i>	0.286 (0.692)	0.873 (0.317)
<i>Status – quo group</i>	1.056 (1.103)	0.272 (0.690)
<i>Regime – change group</i>	0.465 (0.596)	0.944 (0.283)
<i>State – sponsored group</i>	-1.084 (0.902)	-1.047 (0.912)
<i>Recipient rivalry</i>	—	—
<i>Post – 911</i>	0.311 (0.714)	-0.009 (0.702)
<i>Cold War</i>	-1.100 (1.179)	-0.710 (1.361)
Observations	828	828
Log Likelihood	-102.496	-102.762

*p<0.1; **p<0.05

Cubic time polynomials were included in each model, but coefficients are not presented here

Table 23: Replication of Table 2 in main text using only top 15% most resource-wealthy countries

Aid type:	Anti-US attacks		Non-US attacks	
	Security	Total	Security	Total
<i>Intercept</i>	-1.790 (3.858)	-3.511 (3.935)	-11.952** (1.546)	-12.273** (1.545)
<i>Aid to personalist regime</i>	0.189** (0.058)	0.292** (0.098)	0.127** (0.021)	0.127** (0.021)
<i>Aid to non – personalist regime</i>	0.011 (0.021)	-0.084** (0.040)	-0.023** (0.009)	-0.047** (0.012)
<i>Personalist regime, no aid</i>	-1.908* (1.008)	-4.222** (1.866)	-0.918** (0.327)	-1.207** (0.355)
<i>Democracy</i>	-0.172 (0.328)	-0.080 (0.330)	0.440** (0.159)	0.427 (0.157)
<i>Military regime</i>	0.051 (0.388)	0.145 (0.387)	0.626** (0.179)	0.678** (0.179)
<i>ln(GDP per cap)</i>	0.158 (0.183)	0.227 (0.184)	0.669** (0.078)	-0.013 (0.218)
<i>ln(population)</i>	0.009 (0.140)	0.066 (0.143)	0.307** (0.052)	0.668** (0.077)
<i>Civil war</i>	0.908** (0.201)	0.860** (0.207)	1.065** (0.090)	1.059** (0.091)
<i>Cold war</i>	-0.515** (0.195)	-0.468** (0.196)	-0.441** (0.091)	-0.479** (0.563)
<i>Post 911</i>	-0.840** (0.216)	-0.886** (0.221)	-0.584** (0.091)	-0.604** (0.091)
<i>Recipient rivalry</i>	0.223 (0.243)	0.156 (0.243)	0.535** (0.107)	0.521** (0.107)
<i>Press censorship</i>	-0.672** (0.171)	-0.585** (0.172)	-0.208** (0.076)	-0.179** (0.076)
<i>Endogeneity</i>	0.044 (0.031)	0.141** (0.052)	0.019 (0.012)	0.044** (0.016)
Observations	962	962	1,085	1,085
Log Likelihood	-643.271	-637.347	-2,652.358	-2,647.111

*p<0.1; **p<0.05

Table 24: Competing risks duration models

Aid type:	Security	Total
<i>Aid to personalist regime</i>	0.870 (0.101)	0.796** (0.098)
<i>Aid to non – personalist regime</i>	0.984† (0.030)	1.044 (0.034)
<i>Personalist regime, no aid</i>	1.854 (1.008)	11.976* (1.866)
<i>Democracy</i>	1.025 (0.813)	0.966 (0.710)
<i>Military regime</i>	0.655 (0.611)	0.602 (0.529)
<i>ln(GDP per cap)</i>	0.404 (0.254)	0.317* (0.198)
<i>ln(population)</i>	1.831 (1.286)	2.325 (1.729)
<i>Territorial group</i>	0.877 (0.319)	0.873 (0.317)
<i>Status – quo group</i>	1.056 (1.103)	0.757 (0.383)
<i>Regime – change group</i>	0.981 (0.294)	0.944 (0.283)
<i>State – sponsored group</i>	0.736 (0.902)	0.763 (0.234)
<i>Recipient rivalry</i>	1.144 (0.834)	0.951 (0.672)
Observations	5,471	5,471
Log Likelihood	-802.794	-801.776
Country dummies	✓	✓

† Values presented here are subhazard ratios, not coefficients

*p<0.1; **p<0.05

Failure event: group ends due to police force or splintering

Competing events: group ends due to achievement of goals; defeat by external military force; or entry into politics

Figure 11:

